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ABSTRACT 
Network neutrality is a principle dictating that traffic flowing over a network does 
so without discrimination.  Whether government regulation is necessary to 
ensure the Internet as we know it is perpetuated in today’s relatively neutral state 
is being debated more and more, as use of the Internet becomes more vital to 
everyone on a day-to-day basis and content grows at an incredible rate.   
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 2009 decided to act in 
this regard and proceed in an attempt to identify rules that will preserve a free 
and open Internet.  The basis of these rules are six principles that the FCC has 
proposed (directed at broadband providers) that outline what it believes will 
maintain a free and open Internet.  Debate has formed among three groups: 
• Those favoring this sort of regulation by the government 
• Those who determine it is unnecessary 
• Those who propose that the FCC, has no authority granted by 
Congress to implement its proposed rules.   
This thesis examines the debate, formulates conclusions, and proposes 
recommendations that will ensure the Internet remains the incredibly effective 
innovation tool into which it has grown. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Network Neutrality, a concept associated with the Internet, has, in the last 
few years, become an issue due to the increased importance of what the Internet 
provides for individuals, business, government and education.  While no formal 
definition exists, a management guideline where content, regardless of its type, 
receives no discrimination while travelling across a network, characterizes 
network neutrality (Internet Society, 2010). 
The Internet today is essentially a neutral network.  However, debate 
exists regarding whether government regulation, in some form, is necessary in 
order to maintain the Internet in its present form.  Network providers including 
telecommunications companies such as AT&T and Verizon and cable companies 
such as Comcast have invested billions of dollars in creating and maintaining 
their networks under a business model based on the current situation and 
conclude that a change in the regulatory status of their networks is both 
unnecessary and potentially harmful.  Illustrating the position of these companies 
is this quote from Edward Whitacre, the former CEO of AT&T: 
How do you think they’re going to get customers? Through a 
broadband pipe. Cable companies have them. We have them. Now 
what they would like to do is use my pipes for free, but I ain’t going 
to let them do that because we have spent this capital and we have 
to have a return on it. So there’s going to have to be some 
mechanism for these people who use these pipes to pay for the 
portion they’re using. Why should they be allowed to use my pipes? 
The Internet can’t be free in that sense, because we and the cable 
companies have made an investment and [for] a Google or Yahoo! 
or Vonage or anybody to expect to use these pipes for free is nuts! 
(O’connell, 2005) 
Others, including application providers, search engines such as Google, 
government organizations such as the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), and many influential individuals involved in the creation of the early 
Internet, determine that regulation is necessary to perpetuate the Internet in its 
present form.  These individuals cite a number of reasons that, in their opinion, 
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make regulation necessary.  The reasons cited include the ever increasing, 
importance of what the Internet provides, the over dependence of everyone 
involved on the companies that provide the networks over which the data on the 
Internet flows, as well as specific instances where network providers involved 
have initiated network management practices that go against the principles of 
network neutrality.  Taken as a whole, these factors suggest a need for 
regulation to maintain the Internet as it exists today. 
A. THE STATE OF THE INTERNET TODAY 
The Internet, in its current state, is essentially a neutral network.  
Exceptions to this rule exist, but for the most part, packets arrive at their 
destination without discrimination.  The exceptions mentioned consist of some 
justified exceptions based on the needs of the forwarding technology, such as 
VoIP, and the more publicized exceptions made by broadband companies for 
economic reasons.  A truly neutral network, as described earlier, would forward 
traffic completely without regard for the content contained within the packets it 
was forwarding.  By this purist definition, certain applications running on the 
Internet would be useless if this were the case today.  Applications such as 
streaming video and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) would not be able to 
operate if today’s Internet were truly neutral, and because of this, certain 
technical exceptions exist, and are accepted, without adding to the current 
debate.  In general, beyond those accepted deviations today’s Internet is 
essentially neutral.  
Several instances, however, have occurred where network providers have 
discriminated concerning content or volume, and these examples provide enough 
evidence to proponents of the need for regulation to justify regulation of 
networks.  Perhaps the most famous and almost certainly the most pertinent 
example of discrimination by a network provider is Comcast’s blocking of the 
peer-to-peer file transfer service BitTorrent, which became news in 2007. This 
particular case was aggravated when Comcast subsequently denied this practice 
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in testimony to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).  The case is 
ongoing, but oral arguments in January 2010 did not favor the FCC and have 
further fueled the network neutrality debate (Comcast v. FCC, 2010). 
B. THE FCC’S NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING REGARDING 
NETWORK NEUTRALITY 
The FCC is the organization that has taken the lead in policing incidents of 
discrimination by network providers and since 2005, the FCC has been basing its 
oversight of access to the Internet on an Internet policy statement consisting of 
four principles it deemed users of the Internet were entitled to expect.  The four 
principles adopted sought to ensure users had access to any lawful content they 
chose, could run applications and use services of their choice, connect any legal 
devices they chose to a network as long as it did not harm the network and 
support competition among network providers, application and service providers 
and content providers (FCC GN 05-151, 2010).   
In October 2009, the FCC announced a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM) regarding the preservation of a “free and open Internet.”  The NPRM’s 
purpose was to codify the four existing rules in their Internet policy statement and 
add two new rules.  The additional rules sought to prohibit discrimination of 
content by network providers and to force network providers to make their 
network management policies available to users of their networks.  This NPRM is 
currently accepting public comment; when complete and if passed, these rules 
will dictate how network providers must regulate their networks (FCC GN 09-91, 
2009). 
C. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the current debate concerning 
whether rules or laws are necessary in order to maintain network neutrality within 
the Internet.  History, including the history of the FCC as well as the history of 
telecommunications regulation, will be examined in order to make conclusions 
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and recommendations on what the correct course of action in this situation is.  
The following research questions will be answered: 
1.  Is some sort of regulation of network providers necessary in order to 
maintain the Internet, as we know it today? 
2. Based on the history of telecommunications regulation, what affect will 
regulation, whether it is the NPRM proposed by the FCC, a law passed by 
congress or some other regulatory measure have upon the Internet? 
3.  Does the FCC have the necessary jurisdiction to impose rules that 
constrain network providers? 
4.  Besides enacting a regulatory measure, in broad measure across all 
network providers, what other actions will ensure that network providers act in 
the best interests of not only themselves but the users of the Internet. 
The scope of this thesis is to determine the effects of proposed regulation 
that seeks to dictate how network providers, provide access to the Internet. An 
examination of the history of both telecommunications regulation in the past 100 
years, as well as the regulatory history of the FCC, will assist in making this 
determination.  Additionally, consideration of the thoughts of both the proponents 
and opponents of legislation that perpetuates network neutrality will help 
determine the merits of any anticipated course of action.  The thesis is limited in 
that it is simply predictive, and only history will allow us to fully understand the 
result of actions taken in this matter.  
D. ORGANIZATION  
Chapter II will provide Background information revolving around the 
history of telecommunications regulation, prior network neutrality decisions and 
the early Internet.  Chapter III will examine the origins and regulatory history of 
the FCC as well as the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Chapter IV will 
evaluate the positions of those who propose regulation and those who consider it 
unnecessary.  Chapter V will outline the proposals of those same proponents and 
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opponents as well as my own recommendations.  Chapter VI will provide 
conclusions and recommendations for future work. 
 6
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II. TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION AND INTERNET 
HISTORY  
A. TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION HISTORY 
1. Telegraph, Telephone, Cable Television and Common Carriers 
In June 1934, President Franklin Deleanor Roosevelt signed the 
Telecommunications act of 1934 as part of the New Deal.  The purpose of the act 
was to regulate communications and commerce and to improve wire and radio 
communications in order to provide the United States with a world-class and 
dependable communications system.  Within the act, there exist seven titles.  
Title II describes the regulatory guidelines concerning common carriers. A 
common carrier is a business that transports people, goods or services with the 
authority to provide these services granted and overseen by a regulatory body.  
Earlier in 1934 also saw the creation of the FCC, and it now served as the 
regulatory body that would oversee the common carrier status of wire and radio 
communications.  Common carrier status would regulate the status of telegraph, 
telephone and finally, cable television, and would eventually contribute to the 
breakup of the one of the largest telecommunications monopoly in history, that of 
American Telegraph and Telephone (AT&T).  The advent of data networks and 
the Internet created the need to classify another service to deal with the specifics 
of data flow; these would be termed “information services” (Furchtgott-Roth, 
2006). 
2. Information Services 
The Telecommunications Act of 1934 would remain in effect until 1996, 
when President Bill Clinton signed the Telecommunications act of 1996 into law 
on February 8, 1996, some 62 years later.  The development of Internet service 
providers (ISP’s), cable over the Internet and digital subscriber lines (DSL) 
dictated the need to classify Internet services as a type of service within the act.  
Difficulty arose when classifying Internet over cable lines and Internet over DSL, 
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as these services were provided by the same service that had previously been 
classified as a common carrier.  Eventually, however, Internet access, however it 
is provided, was classified as an “information service,” and these services were 
classified within Title I of the communications act and were not considered 
common carriers.  These services, not regulated as common carriers, have come 
under the auspice of the FCC under its ancillary jurisdiction mandated in Title I 
(Nuechterlien & Weiser, 2007). 
B. COMPUTER NETWORKS REGULATORY DECISIONS (1960–
PRESENT)  
By the 1960s, innovators had begun to utilize the capability of 
communications through computers transmitting data over the existing 
infrastructure of the telephone industry.  The FCC quickly realized the 
tremendous potential of this fledgling technology and began to contemplate its 
position about the position it would take in regard to the regulation of computer 
networks.  The result of its contemplation over the next several years would 
become three inquiries into how it would regulate these networks, called the 
Computer Inquiries (Cannon, 2003).  These inquiries, which history considers 
extremely effective, mark the first attempts at regulation of enhanced services, or 
what we would now call high-speed Internet, and are important to revisit to set 
the baseline for events to follow.  
1. The Computer Inquiries 
a. Computer I 
The issues the FCC considered most important in 1966 and 
attempted to address in Computer Inquiry I, included whether to, and to what 
extent, data processing services should be regulated and whether existing 
companies considered common carriers would be permitted to participate in 
offering these services.  The real outcome of this first inquiry was the creation of 
a clear separation between what would was considered an unregulated data 
processing service and what comprised equipment and infrastructure that 
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composed the regulated voice communications networks.  History notes that 
Computer I was an important first step that separated computer networks and the 
voice industry that set the stage for the beginning of the Internet as we know it 
(Cannon, 2003).   
b. Computer II  
Computer Inquiry I remained in effect until May 1980 and defined a 
clear distinction between basic and enhanced services.  Basic services were 
those that could be regulated and enhanced services would remain unregulated.  
This played a large part in shaping what the Internet would become.  However, 
Computer Inquiry I also prohibited BOC’s from entering into the enhanced 
service market.  The FCC modified this in the Computer II inquiry.  The FCC had 
realized that the enormous resources of these companies would greatly 
contribute to the development of data communications.  Computer II allowed 
these companies to enter the enhanced service market, but only under two 
conditions.  First, any telephone company that intended to offer enhanced 
services could do so only under a completely different corporate entity and this 
new corporation would act as a standalone entity.  Second, a telephone company 
selling its underlying communications capability, the regulated portion of the 
network, would have to separate or “unbundle” this from the enhanced service 
and sell it to any and all in a non-discriminatory manner.  In other words, it would 
have to sell the regulated portion to its own enhanced service corporation for the 
same price as it would sell to any ISP (Nuechterlein & Weiser, 2006).  
c. Computer Inquiry III 
While the FCC felt the corporate separation between the enhanced 
service provider and the basic service provider, this requirement was extremely 
costly to the companies that wished to participate in both markets.  In 1985, the 
FCC repealed the requirement to create a separate corporation for providing 
enhanced services and instead put in place regulations that would ensure the 
intent of separating the services was fulfilled.  Computer Inquiry III also 
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strengthened the FCC’s stand on the unbundling of these services.  This was 
meant, in part, to ensure that the regulation of enhanced services remained 
clearly under the auspice of Title I of the communications act (Cannon, 2003).   
d. Computer Inquiry Legacy 
The Computer Inquiries as a whole strengthened the position of 
information services as non-regulated or lightly regulated. They are considered a 
great success, and when Congress amended the Communications of in 1996 to 
its present form, much of the intent of the Computer Inquiries remained intact.  
The Computer Inquiries also set a precedent for the FCC’s position on the 
subject at the time, and the FCC was considered a champion of light regulation in 
this area in the 1980s and 1990s, when the Internet was developing.   Many also 
believe that these policies were one of the key elements ensuring the Internet’s 
early success.   
2. Cable and DSL Supreme Court Rulings 
By the late 1990s, the popularity of receiving Internet access through a 
cable TV modem was becoming popular, and with this popularity came questions 
about how or if this service would be regulated.  Two specific questions would 
become important issues.  The first question asked whether to classify cable 
Internet service as a Title I or Title II service.  The second question was 
necessary because of a unique aspect of the structure of the cable service itself.  
In the case of cable Internet service, the company that provided the service 
owned the entire infrastructure that delivered the service.  This differs from 
service provided through a phone line because the phone line delivers the 
service, but one of many providers of Internet access could provide the service.  
In the case of cable, the cable company owned the cables delivering the service, 
and through an ISP affiliated with the company, it provided the service itself.  The 
second question now became whether the cable companies should open their 
delivery service to other ISPs to offer the service through the cable company’s 
infrastructure.  In a series of rulings involving the FCC, the Court of Appeals for 
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the Ninth Circuit court and finally the Supreme Court, it was determined that 
Internet service through cable modem was not a telecommunications service and 
was thus unregulated. Additionally, it was decided that cable companies would 
not be forced to open their networks to other ISPs.  Today, the case of National 
Cable & Telecommunications Association et al. v. Brand X Internet Services et 
al. defines the fate of cable Internets classification.  The result in this case found 
the Supreme Court overturning a previous ruling by the Ninth Circuit Court and 
classified Internet access through cable modem as a Title I, unregulated service.  
(Furchtgott-Roth, 2006).  
A similar route to deregulation existed for Internet over digital subscriber 
line (DSL).  In August 2005, the FCC issued a ruling stating that Internet service 
obtained in this manner was an unregulated information service.  This was, at the 
time, a decision that would greatly enhance the ability of consumers to obtain 
broadband Internet at an affordable price and in a competitive manner.  The U.S 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Court in Philadelphia more recently 
reviewed this ruling and upheld the decisions of the FCC in October 2007 
(Reuter’s, 2007). 
3. The 2005 FCC Internet Policy Statement 
All the significant previous decisions created a trend by the FCC of 
minimizing deregulation. At this point, the FCC may have realized it needed to 
create balance in the way it addressed the handling of this industry. Whether the 
FCC thought  it needed to create balance or if was for some other reason,  on the 
same day it announced the deregulation of DSL service it also announced a 
policy statement regarding what consumers should be able to expect in regard to 
accessing the Internet.  The policy statement issued consisted of four principles 
directed at broadband Internet providers and designed to protect the consumers 
using broadband Internet service.  The four principles the FCC felt broadband 
consumers should be able to expect included: 
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• an expectation to be able to access any legal content on the 
Internet 
• the ability to use any legal application or service, this principle is 
subject to the needs of law enforcement 
• connect any legal device to the network as long as it doesn’t harm 
the network 
• Have a competitive choice between broadband, application, service 
and content providers (FCC 05-151, 2005) 
It is important to note that at this time, that these principles were simply 
the policy of the FCC, and not the result of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, as 
is often how the FCC issues regulation, or as an interpretation of their jurisdiction 
under the Communications Act or as a law.  These principles were nothing more 
than a policy statement of the FCC, used to guide their decisions in cases where 
incidents requiring their attention arose. 
4. 2007 FCC v. Comcast (Bit Torrent)   
In 2007, an event that conflicted with the FCC’s four Internet principles did 
occur.  Users of broadband Internet service provided by Comcast Cable utilizing 
a file-sharing service called BitTorrent began to experience trouble utilizing the 
service.  Eventually, complaints began to emerge and the FCC investigated 
Comcast concerning the possibility that Comcast was blocking access to 
BitTorrent.  Comcast originally denied the accusations, but after time, it did admit 
to blocking BitTorrent from time to time for purposes that benefited its network as 
a whole.  The FCC then issued a ruling informing Comcast that blocking 
BitTorrent violated its policy and ordered them to cease.  Comcast complied with 
this order, but then took the matter to court in the case that most visibly 
represents the debate that is network neutrality.  This case was finally decided in 
April 2010, with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia deciding 
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that the FCC did not have jurisdiction concerning dictating to Comcast how it 
would regulate its network (Comcast v. FCC, 2010). 
5. 2009 FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and the National 
Broadband Plan 
In October 2009, during the period the Comcast trial was underway but 
before the outcome of the case, the FCC announced a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM) seeking to codify the four existing principles created in the 
2005 Internet policy statement and add two additional principles.  Together, 
these six principles would form the basis for FCC rulings.  The two additional 
rules sought to ensure: 
• nondiscrimination by requiring that, subject to reasonable network 
management, broadband providers treat all lawful content, 
applications and services in a nondiscriminatory manner and; 
• transparency by dictating that broadband providers disclose, 
subject to reasonable network management, how they managed 
their networks including any information required by users in order 
to satisfy the other principles of the NPRM (FCC 09-191, 2009). 
At about the same time that the FCC announced the NPRM,  it also began 
announcements surrounding a national broadband plan.  This would be a 
government-sponsored initiative that would examine broadband in the United 
States and seek ways to increase its availability to greater numbers of people.  
The FCC until now had not been involved in broadband infrastructure and this 
plan was the beginnings of a change in that regard (Schatz, 209).  One can 
imagine the significant investment the national broadband plan represents 
instantly raises the level of interest of the government in regulation of the 
Internet.   Considering this raised level of interest, one can imagine the link 
between the FCC’s NPRM and the looming implementation of the National 
Broadband Plan. 
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C. ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET, MAJOR MILESTONES AND ITS 
INNOVATORS 
Today’s Internet has become a tool of magnificent power.   Its impact on 
education, research, world economies and indeed most aspects of life has 
become almost ubiquitous.  In October 1995, the Federal Networking Council 
(FNC) announced a resolution that defined the term “Internet” as referring to the 
global information system that: 
• Is logically linked together by a globally unique address 
space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its subsequent 
extensions/follow-ones;  
• is able to support communications using the Transmission 
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its 
subsequent extensions/follow-ones, and/or other IP-
compatible protocols; and  
• provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or 
privately, high level services layered on the communications 
and related infrastructure described herein (Internet Society, 
2010) 
This definition comes almost 30 years after the innovation and collaboration of 
many scientists enabled the first two host computers on the ARPANET to 
communicate with each other on October 3, 1969 (Beranek, 2000).  The Internet 
has changed greatly since then and a discussion of the origins of the Internet and 
those who were integral in its beginnings are vital to a discussion of how or if 
regulation that seeks to perpetuate network neutrality is necessary. 
1. DARPA and the ARPANET 
In August 1962, J.C.R. Licklider while working at the Defense Advanced 
Projects Agency conceived of a globally interconnected group of computers from 
which individuals could access data and applications from anywhere.  Licklider 
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discussed his ideas with a group of scientists, including Lawrence Roberts, which 
would be his successors at DARPA of the importance of his thoughts on 
networked computers (Leiner et al., 1997). 
Before the mid-1960s, communications circuits operated on the dedicated 
end-to-end concept of circuit switching.   In July 1961, Leonard Kleinrock, a 
professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) published a paper on a 
concept termed packet switching.  As opposed to circuit switching requirement 
for a dedicated circuit for a communications session, packet switching would 
break down message data into packets and be transmitted in pieces to be 
rearranged later by the receiver of the message (Internet Society, 2010).  
Utilizing the vision he described by Licklider and the packet switching concept 
Lawrence Roberts was able to connect a computer in Massachusetts to one in 
California through a dial-up line (Leiner et al., 1997). 
Roberts now realized that computers could communicate through packet 
switched networks, but how difficult it was and the need for in depth research on 
a full-scale implemented network.  A “request for proposal” (RFP) was released 
which sought a network that consisted of four interface messages processors 
(IMP’s - essentially the first routers). The RFP stated that once this four-node 
network proved successful it would expand to 15 nodes.  A researcher at Bolt, 
Beranek and Newman Corp. (BBN) won the contract that sought the 
development of the IMP’s themselves (Beranek, 2000).  UCLA, the Stanford 
Research Institute, the University of California at Santa Barbara and the 
University of Utah all received contracts to act as host sites (Beranek, 2000).  
UCLA installed the first IMP host site in September 1969 quickly followed by the 
second IMP at the Stanford Research Institute in October.  On October 3, 1969 
the first message was passed and network communications was born (Internet 
Society, 2010).  By December 1970, the Network Working Group (NWG) led by 
Steve Crocker had finished what the group termed the Network Control Protocol 
(NCP), the host-to-host communications protocol of the ARPANET and 
predecessor to TCP.  By this time, the ARPANET had added several different 
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host sites and with the advent of a communications protocol researches at these 
host sites could begin developing applications that would run over the ARPANET 
(Leiner et al., 1997). 
Despite the successful implementation of the ARPANET, by 1972 the 
difficulty in establishing a node and the limited return of capabilities on an 
investment in establishing a node meant that the ARPANET was not growing as 
quickly as anticipated.  Two things occurred that year which made the ARPANET 
more popular.  In October 1972, Bob Kahn hosted a large public demonstration 
of the ARPANET at the International Computer Communication Conference 
(ICCC); the demonstration was successful and raised the level of awareness of 
ARPANET capabilities (Kleinrock, 2008).  The year 1972 also saw the release of 
an application with great utility that made the presence of a network over which it 
could run very important.  Ray Tomlinson, also a researcher at BBN, released his 
e-mail application, at first to make coordination efforts over the ARPANET easier, 
but other uses for e-mail quickly surfaced.  These two events turned the tide for 
the ARPANET and things quickly grew from there (Beranek, 2010). 
2. Vint Cerf / Bob Kahn and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
ARPANET was a single network composed of nodes all communicating 
through via the NCP.  The Internet we know today is a group of networks with 
internal communication assigned accordingly by their network managers, but still 
able to communicate with all the other networks on the Internet which may be 
using a different internal communication protocol.  This type of flexibility was not 
utilizing simply NCP as the communications protocol and an alternative was 
necessarily developed.  Bob Kahn introduced the idea of open-architecture 
networking while working at DARPA in 1972.  His ideas on the subject relied on 




• Each network would stand independent and no internal changes 
would be necessary for that network to connect to the Internet 
• Delivery of packets was on a “best-effort” basis and if a necessary 
packet did not arrive at its destination, it would be retransmitted 
• Networks connections consisted of “Black Boxes,” later called 
routers, and these routers would perform no other tasks beyond 
forwarding packets.  Their simplicity reduced the overall complexity 
of the network 
• There would be no overarching control at the operational level 
(Internet Society, 2010). 
In 1973, Kahn realized that in order to implement his ideas on open-
architecture networking he would need to understand how to interface his 
networking protocol with the operating systems involved.  Vint Cerf had been 
involved with the development and implementation of NCP and had an 
understanding of how to interface networking protocols with operating systems.  
Together Cerf and Kahn collaborated and wrote the paper that formed the 
foundation for the networking protocol in widespread use still today.  The paper 
titled “A Protocol for packet network interconnection” published in May 1974, 
initially described a protocol that relied completely on TCP.  Later in order to 
allow applications to defer using the advantage of the capabilities of TCP, the 
concept of Internet Protocol (IP) and was now termed TCP/IP.  Three groups led 
by Cerf at Stanford, Tomlinson at BBN and Peter Kirstein at the University 
College London.  This began a long-term development of the specifications of 
TCP, but by 1980, TCP/IP was the defense standard and ARPANET transferred 
from NCP to TCP/IP in 1983.  It is important to note that TCP/IP’s designed 
focused on supporting large computers on time-sharing systems.  Many worried 
that TCP/IP would be too complex to operate when desktop computers first 
appeared in the networks running this protocol (Leaner et al., 1997).  One event 
that cemented TCP/IP’s use worldwide occurred when, in 1985, Dennis Jennings 
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who was leading the NSFNET announced that TCP/IP would be mandatory on 
that network.  By 1990, TCP/IP had become for all practical purposes the defacto 
standard on most worldwide networks (Internet Society, 2010). 
3. The Internet’s Leaders and Guiding Bodies 
Since its inception, the innovators who designed the protocols and ideas 
that formed the Internet have worked closely together in the spirit of innovation 
and this has been integral to the success the Internet has seen.  Several 
advisory boards began arising as early as the 1970s to act as the steering 
guidance of the Internet; the following is a list of some of those boards, their 
leaders and its purpose: 
• 1970s International Cooperation Board  (ICB) formed by Vint Cerf 
and led by Peter Kirstein to coordinate with European Companies 
• The Internet Configuration Control Board, also formed in the 1970s 
to assist Vint Cerf in the now exploding number of issues 
surrounding the growing Internet 
• In 1983, The ICCB was replaced with a number of different 
committees led by the Internet Activities Board (IAB) at DARPA 
• The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) was formed in 1985 as 
one committee supporting the IAB, engineering quickly became 
vital to Internet growth and the IETF quickly became a major 
Internet steering group 
• The Internet Society was formed in 1992 and the Internet Society, 
the IAB and the IETF each formed a niche in guidance of the 
Internet (Internet Society, 2010). 
Throughout the years of its development, these groups openly 
collaborated and made the decisions that would mark the Internets future.  These 
groups and the individuals who were the leaders have deep-seated feelings 
about their responsibility about the well-being of the Internet and their authority in 
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making decisions about its future.  Due to perhaps partly their deep-seated 
feelings about the perpetuation of the Internet in its initial form, many of the 




Figure 1.   Internet Milestones (From Internet Society, 2010). 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter began by describing historical telecommunications regulation 
and the changes that occurred with the advent of computer networking.  This 
new type of service, deemed separate from traditional common carriage, was 




FCC, which outlined their position on information services, and all three of these 
rulings strengthened the position of Information Services as an unregulated or 
lightly regulated service. 
Technology advanced and soon FCC rulings and court cases would 
determine whether Internet service obtained from cable companies or over 
phone lines (DSL) was an information services or would be subject to regulation 
as a common carrier.  In both instances, the result would ensure that Internet 
service in general, including via cable or through DSL, was an unregulated 
service.  Until this point all FCC rulings and the results of all the court cases that 
considered these cases had ruled in favor of no regulation or light regulation of 
high-speed Internet service.  However, the same day in 2005 that DSL was 
deregulated, the FCC also released their Internet Policy Statement that set forth 
the set of rights the FCC expected that consumers who received Internet service 
from a provider could expect.  This marks a turning point in how the FCC would 
handle the regulation of access to the Internet and is the first attempt at 
regulation.  The four rules comprising the policy statement also compose four of 
the six rules set forth in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking the FCC proposed in 
2009. 
The chapter ended by outlining the historical achievements that formed 
the beginnings of the Internet, along with those achievements that ensured its 
growth.  When Bob Kahn was first conceiving the concept that would become 
TCP, the term that formed the basis of his idea was “open-architecture 
networking” and the fourth key concept in his idea stated there would be no 
global control at the operations level.  Kahn placed a great deal of importance on 
maintaining an open Internet with no global control when he designed TCP.  He 
and other scientists had worked together for years in an open and collaborative 
environment to ensure the Internet’s early success.  Considering the 
collaborative environment the Internet was conceived in, it is no wonder that 
some of these individuals are some of the greatest proponents of enacting 
regulation that ensures the Internet continues to operate as a neutral network. 
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III. THE FCC 
The Federal Communications Commission is the government agency that 
has regulated telecommunications in the United States since 1934.  Since the 
advent of computer networks, their duties have included regulating the flow of 
data over computer networks and these new duties have put them at the center 
of the network neutrality debate.  Other government entities, including Congress 
or the court system exist that could take an active role in any regulation imposed 
on network providers but it is the FCC, that today, is taking the lead in attempting 
to impose regulation.  This chapter will investigate several aspects surrounding 
the FCC organizationally and will include discussions on the following: 
• the origins of the FCC and its  evolution; 
• the regulatory history of the FCC, including the decades long 
relationship with AT&T, the biggest telecommunications force of 
the 20th century and other examples of FCC regulatory oversights 
• A discussion of The Telecommunications Act of 1934 and 1996. 
A. ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND OF THE FCC  
The Telecommunications Act of 1934 created the Federal 
Communications Commission.  At inception the FCC was designed to provide 
oversight to both wireless (radio) and wired (telephone and telegraph) 
communications.  Prior to 1934, the FCC been preceded by the establishment of 
the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) which acted under the auspices of the 
1927 Radio Act.  This act had nationalized the electromagnetic spectrum within 
the United States due to the growing number of disputes involving the ownership 
of spectrum allocated for radio stations. Radio was the overwhelming focus of the 
fledgling FCC; however, the original agenda of the FCC did include wired 
communications (Huber, 1997).  Since 1934, when the FCC’s scope was mainly 
to provide oversight to wired and wireless communication, the 
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telecommunications world has become greatly more complex the duties of the 
FCC have expanded greatly.  Today, the current agenda of the FCC includes the 
following categories of regulation of interstate and international communications 





• and cable 
The leadership of the FCC consists of five commissioners, that are appointed by 
the President and which normally serves a five-year term.  One of the five 
commissioners is also selected by the President to act as Chairperson 
(Furchtgott-Roth, 2006). 
B. REGULATORY HISTORY 
 Businesses understand that regulatory policy is sometimes necessary in 
order for the government to ensure fair competition between competitors as well 
as between businesses and their customers.  Problems arise for business when 
the regulatory policy is vague or its effects are not consistent with their intentions. 
When making judgments concerning the effectiveness of any regulatory body, 
including the FCC, it is helpful to have a set of criteria with which to form one’s 
judgment.  Jonathan Nuechterlein and Philip J. Weiser in their book: DIGITAL 
CROSSROADS: AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE 
INTERNET AGE, suggest a set of four values that an organization, creating 




• determinacy  -  developing rules that can be readily ascertained 
and predictably applied;  
• expertise - decision-making institutions have a complete 
understanding of the technologies involved and the industry; 
• neutrality -  The regulatory organization maintains a primary focus 
on maximizing consumer welfare; and  
• Humility - an inclination to “respect the market’s ability to enhance 
consumer welfare” and “to give due regard to the unpredictable 
course of technological and economic change (Nuechterlein & 
Weiser, 2007). 
The following examines the consequences of decisions made by the FCC 
where the organization has either overstepped its bounds, wasted money and/or 
time unnecessarily along finally instances where the results of its decisions 
brought about results different from what were intended.  Examples of these 
missteps occur throughout the history of the FCC, but for the purpose of this 
examination, these examples are grouped into these areas: 
• The FCC’s relationship with AT&T; 
• The FCC’s actions in company mergers; 
• The FCC’s interaction with the judicial system; and 
• Misinterpretation of the Telecommunications Act. 
1. The FCC and AT&T 
Throughout most of its history, the FCC has had the regulation of AT&T as 
one of its major duties; oversight of AT&T.  Examining this relationship gives a 
chronological record of actions taken by the FCC that had negative effects on 




industry as a whole.  The following is a chronological list of actions taken 
throughout the FCC and AT&T relationship that illustrate these actions.  The 
following will be specifically discussed: 
• A formal investigation of AT&T begun in 1934 
• Actions that dictated AT&T’s business practices during World War II 
• AT&T v. Harry Tuttle and the Hush-a-phone 
• Attempted breakup of AT&T & Western Electric in 1949 
• The FCC’s move away from AT&T being a regulated monopoly 
• The Carterfone case 
• The 1980s breakup of AT&T 
By 1934, AT&T was already a major telecommunications company and 
when Congress signed the Communications Act of 1934 and created the FCC 
one of the new agencies major duties was to oversee the dealings of AT&T.  In 
performance of these duties and at the request of Congress, the FCC conducted 
the first of two formal investigations of the AT&T in 1935.  At the time, phone 
service was considered a natural monopoly and FCC decisions supported AT&T 
remaining a monopoly for several decades.  Specifically in 1935 however, neither 
Congress nor the FCC offered no reason for the formal investigation that: 
• Dragged on until 1938; 
• Cost the government two million dollars; 
• AT&T one and a half million dollars; 
• Resulted with no formal recommendations for change. 
Oversight of companies, especially companies as large as AT&T in the 
1930, and investigations are a part of this oversight.  However, actions of the 
magnitude describe should be justified, be conducted as quickly as possible and 
should preferably uncover some reason to justify the investigation in the first 
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place.  This investigation however, is the beginning of a long series of 
questionable FCC actions in its dealing with AT&T (Lundy, 2008). 
A factor that cannot be overlooked in applying telecommunications 
regulation is whether the regulation will have its intended effect and only its 
intended effect. Less than a decade after the initial investigation of AT&T, the 
FCC again intervened in the business dealings of AT&T.  In this instance, the 
FCC’s intentions were for the good of the country but the results of their 
regulation were not what were initially intended.  AT&T’s network, following the 
Great Depression and at the beginning of World War II, was in dire need of repair 
and the company needed to improve its capital position in order to do so.  The 
FCC’s policies, during this period, concerning long distance rates however would 
prevent this.  In the name of increasing capacity for calls supporting the war 
effort, the FCC initiated price cuts on long distance service.  These cuts 
produced a disproportionate increase in demand for long distance and the 
already diminished network was unable to support the demand.  Thus, in an 
attempt to regulate prices and increase the capacity for long distance calls in 
support of the war, the opposite effect occurred (Lundy, 2008).   
Another aspect of the FCC’s regulatory style is its disregard for quick 
resolution to conflicts unless it suits the agency. In the 1940s, AT&T had a very 
restrictive policy, referred to as the foreign attachments tariff, against any 
hardware, except AT&T produced hardware, being placed on its network.  The 
FCC was presented with a challenge to this tariff in 1950 by an inventor by the 
name of Harry Tuttle.  Mr. Tuttle had produced a very simply device referred to 
as the Hush-A-Phone which fit over the mouthpiece of a phone and prevented 
conversations from being overheard.  This device had no electric parts and was 
simply a cup that fit over the mouthpiece and muffled conversation.  The FCC 
allowed AT&T’s tariff to remain in place five years before finally deciding against 
Tuttle and upholding AT&T no foreign attachments policy.  Subsequently, Tuttle 
took his case to court and the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled in his favor.  This 
opened the door for the consideration of other foreign attachments to gain 
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access to the AT&T network. However, the FCC, in what could be considered 
open opposition to the court’s ruling allowed AT&T to rewrite their policy in such 
a restrictive manner that essentially nothing had changed for those seeking 
access (Lundy, 2008). 
Other unintended consequences caused by regulatory bodies are not 
immediately realized and this is the case in reviewing the result of a lawsuit 
begun in January 1949 when the U.S. Department of Justice filed suit against 
AT&T and its equipment supplier Western Electric.  Western Electric was the 
sole supplier of equipment to AT&T and the suit claimed the exclusive 
relationship created a lack of competition and sought to break Western Electric 
apart and separate it from AT&T.  The result, which again took over 5 years to 
come about, of the suit, was a compromise and at the time both sides considered 
the outcome fair.  One of the restrictions placed on AT&T however stated AT&T 
was restricted to the common carrier telecommunications market.  At the time 
this was an acceptable consequence however, later when the computer industry 
began what it would become today; AT&T’s inability to enter this market would 
critically limit the company (Lundy, 2008). 
Consistency in regulation is also important to the regulated business and 
consequences can occur when a regulating body changes course too rapidly.  
While the FCC had been the regulating body of AT&T since 1934, it had done so 
as the regulator of an accepted monopoly and its regulation sought, usually 
unsuccessfully to benefit consumers and AT&T equally.  The FCC’s ability to 
protect AT&T from competition was questioned in the 1950s when two small 
companies applied for licenses from the FCC to set up microwave radio systems 
for internal company communication.  AT&T opposed the application stating it 
would unfairly limit their revenue.  The FCC in the end granted the licenses and 
again this could appear at the time as a small event.  In retrospect, it can be seen 
that it essentially, without intentionally doing so, was the beginning of the end of 
AT&Ts regulated monopoly (Lundy, 2008). 
 27
Another unintended consequences resulting from FCC regulation occurred 
during the 1960s.  In this case, the unintended consequence actually changed 
the market of the entire telephone hardware industry.  The Carterfone was a 
device that connected a radio to the AT&T network and allowed oil workers to 
access the phone network in remote locations where only radio was available.  
The device violated AT&T’s “no foreign attachment” policy whereby no other 
devices besides AT&T hardware would attach to the AT&T network and at the 
time, AT&T this policy meant that AT&T produced all the actual telephones that 
resided on the network.  The FCC issued its ruling on the Carterfone in 1968 with 
the intention of now allowing “foreign attachments” to touch the AT&T network.  It 
was in no way their intention in allowing foreign attachments to allow telephones 
made by other suppliers to be resident on the network.  However, in 
interpretation of this ruling, customers could now attach the phone of their choice, 
instead of an AT&T proprietary phone only, to the network (Lundy, 2008).  With 
absolutely no intention of doing so, in this very specific ruling, the FCC 
unintentionally altered an entire industry and now AT&T would compete with 
other phone suppliers for this market. 
After having protected AT&T as a regulated monopoly since the 1930s; 
actions were initiated on October 27, 1965, that would end that relationship and 
result in the breakup with AT&T.  The FCC initiated a formal investigation in 1965 
initially intended to reevaluate how the FCC performed its regulatory actions over 
FCC and whether their policies should change.  During this period, AT&T was 
further involved in a legal battle with MCI and finally ten years later in November 
1974 the U.S. Department of justice filed suit against AT&T claiming AT&T was 
in violation of antitrust law.  The most significant result of this case was the 
breakup of the AT&T from its 22 Bell operating Companies.  Important for a 
discussion of the FCC is that one of the main intentions of the breakup of AT&T 
was the creation of a competitive environment.  Competition in the long distance 
and communications hardware markets meant the FCC no longer was required 
to maintain regulatory oversight of AT&T and AT&T should have at this point 
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been an unregulated company.  The FCC had never been consulted directly on 
this however and in what can be seen as perpetuating their role in the industry it 
maintained a strict regulatory position over AT&T even in light of a U.S. 
Department of Justice ruling (Lundy, 2008).   
Even in the drafting of the documents from which the FCC draws its 
jurisdiction and with express intentions, it is difficult to determine the outcome.  
The passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was highly anticipated and 
most thought its intentions of limiting regulation, creating competition and 
spurring investment would soon follow.  However, whether it is due to poor 
language within the act, the FCC’s implementation of the Act, a combination of 
these two, or any of a host of other possible reasons; the act has not lived up to 
expectations.  In their 2008 paper entitled “A Critical Evaluation of 
Telecommunication Act 1996,” Kashif Azim Janjua, Sahibzada Ahmed Noor and 
Shahzada Alamgir Khan seek to examine the success or lack thereof of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. As mentioned earlier, one of the Acts intended 
purposes is increasing competition in telecommunications markets, specifically to 
include local telephone markets.  The research of Janjua, Noor and Alamgir 
seeks to document the perceived lack of competitive benefits realized after the 
Act took effect.  The author’s data shows that competitive entrants into the local 
phone market have achieved only a small gain in market percentage.  It further 
shows competitive entry into the market has spurred only a small increase in 
infrastructure investment and that the Regional Bell Operating Companies 
(RBOC’s) that represented a near monopoly before the Act, have reorganized 
and are now approaching the same position AT&T occupied prior to the Act 
(Janjua, K. A.  et al., 2008). 
2. Merger Oversight 
According to United States Law, the merger/acquisition of companies of 
sufficient size are subject to review under anti-trust law by the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  No written law or 
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statute affords the FCC any authority in reviewing mergers or acquisitions.  The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 actually weakened the FCC’s status in 
reviewing major mergers by changes Congress made in the act specifically 
removing its authority regarding mergers.  The FCC remains a force in mergers, 
however, through its license transfer authority.  Through this authority, instead of 
being officially involved in the merger process it interjects itself by refusing to 
grand licenses it controls, which will be required after a merger is complete.  
Thus, the FCC is able to delay (it rarely if ever disapproves) the merger or 
acquisition of companies until the conditions for the merger meet with the FCC’s 
approval.  Besides ensuring that the merger is completed under circumstances 
satisfactory to the FCC, as opposed to satisfactory, to the two companies 
involved and the needs of the consumers, the delay experienced before the FCC 
agrees to the merger is often far longer than would normally be expected if left to 
the anti-trust laws, the DOJ and the FTC.  To illustrate, the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 includes language that seeks to limit the delay in any regulatory 
decision made by the FCC to 90 days; between 1997 and 2002, the average 
delay in an FCC license transfer application pertaining to a merger was over 200 
days.  A specific example involved one of the biggest mergers of the late 1990s 
involving the Bell Atlantic and Nynex merger.  In this case, the FCC took 479 
days before finally approving its license transfer proceeding.   
This kind of regulatory behavior violates at least two of the aforementioned 
criteria important to maintaining a competitive environment.  The simple injection 
of the FCC into the merger process along with the delay created until the FCC is 
satisfies creates uncertainty and is in contrast to a determinate regulatory policy. 
Additionally, the imposing of conditions favorable to the FCC also violates the 
humility criteria by assuming that the will of the two companies involved and 
market conditions will not decide if this merger should be successful.  Finally, if 
the FCC’s requirements for the merger actually increase cost or decrease quality 
for the consumer the neutrality principle is broken (Furchtgott-Roth, 2006).  
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3. Judicial System Interaction 
As stated earlier, investors and businesses base their actions on existing 
forces that could include telecommunications policy that is currently in effect or 
policy anticipated in the near future.  Historically speaking, interpretation of the 
documents that the FCC base their policy recommendations (the 
Telecommunications act of 1934 and 1996) has created numerous cases of  
uncertainty where investment or innovation was slowed or stopped until an issue 
was resolved.  These instances become most detrimental when the FCC 
chooses to investigate a company or industry or when it becomes necessary for 
either party involved to take a matter to court.  The following sections will 
illustrate a number of instances where FCC intervention was detrimental to a 
company or industry. 
When the FCC and business become involved in more than just a formal 
investigation of practice; rulings made by the FCC will often need to be reviewed 
by the court system.  The reasoning behind the need for court intervention is 
often interpretation of the law governing regulation; currently the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Act was written with the best intentions of 
clarifying telecommunications regulation, decreasing regulation and increasing 
competition and passed at a time when both business and government were 
unhappy with the status quo and felt change was needed.  The actual stated 
purpose of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 stated within the Document is: 
To promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure 
lower prices and higher quality services for American 
telecommunications qconsumers and encourage the rapid 
deployment of new telecommunications technologies. 
(Telecommunications Act of 1996, 1996) 
Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth served as a commissioner of the FCC from 
1997 through 2001, in his book A Tough Act to Follow? The Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 and the Separation of Powers, he provides a host of examples of 
court cases that took place between 1996 and 2002 related to 
telecommunications issues and initiated due to FCC intervention.  He examines 
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these cases and identifies two periods of uncertainty businesses experience 
when FCC rulings come into question.  The first period of uncertainty for 
business begins when the FCC issues a ruling on an issue and ends with a court 
decision that contradicts the FCC stance.  The second period of uncertainty 
begins when the FCC attempts to reaffirm its stance and ends with a decisive 
court ruling or in many instances remains unresolved.  In cases where the issue 
remains, unresolved business remains unclear in its direction.  FurchtGott-Roth 
lists eight telecommunications issues where uncertainty is an issue.  Only three 
of the examples eventually had definitive rulings issued and the shortest time to a 
definitive ruling was four years.  Harold Furchtgott-Roth claims these delays are 
due to the non-determinate nature of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and 
the structure of the FCC.  He argues that the FCC’s dual enforcement and 
adjudication nature will continue to create issues with unclear resolution until a 
change occurs in the FCC’s makeup (Furchtgott-Roth, 2006). 
4. Misinterpretation 
Interpretation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is historically one of 
the FCC’s biggest shortcomings in its regulatory nature.  One of the most 
egregious examples of the FCC’s misinterpretation of the Act is its interpretation 
of the language that created the Schools and Library Program.  Even Congress 
was amazed at what came of language in the Act meant to provide a discount on 
telecommunications services to schools and libraries.  The following is the exact 
language in question from the Telecommunications Act of 1996: 
(B) EDUCATIONAL PROVIDERS AND LIBRARIES- All 
telecommunications carriers serving a geographic area shall, upon 
a bona fide request for any of its services that are within the 
definition of universal service under subsection (c)(3), provide such 
services to elementary schools, secondary schools, and libraries for 
educational purposes at rates less than the amounts charged for 
similar services to other parties. The discount shall be an amount 
that the Commission, with respect to interstate services, and the 




and necessary to ensure affordable access to and use of such 
services by such entities. A telecommunications carrier providing 
service under this paragraph shall— 
(i) have an amount equal to the amount of the discount treated as 
an offset to its obligation to contribute to the mechanisms to 
preserve and advance universal service, or 
`(ii) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (e) of this section, 
receive reimbursement utilizing the support mechanisms to 
preserve and advance universal service. (Furchtgott-Roth, 2006) 
The language is vague; making interpretation difficult is a common 
criticism of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  However, as is evident, the 
intent of the above language is not vague and it is very clear that Congress 
simply meant for schools and libraries to have a discount on telecommunications 
services and those providers offering these discounts, reimbursed.  From this, 
however, the FCC suggested a $2.5 billion-funded program that supplemented 
the Universal Service program and subsidize schools and libraries.  The FCC’s 
misinterpretation—discovered, debated and even taken to court—remained in 
place because by that time political support for a program never intended had 
grown, companies opposing the program were fearful of FCC reprisal and 
Congress did not have sufficient time to debate its existence.  The most 
significant impact from this program was to the telecommunications providers 
forced to fund the $2.25 billion that the program finally became from intentions 
meant simply to provide a discount to schools and libraries on 
telecommunications service.  This example is a breech to the principle of humility 
discussed earlier.  The FCC’s actions in this case clearly show its disbelieve that 
markets will take consumer welfare into account by creating a program clearly 




C. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT AND NETWORK NEUTRALITY 
As previously stated, the legal document from which the FCC draws its 
authority is the Telecommunications Act of 1934, amended by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.  The 1934 Act gave birth to the FCC and 
served as the governing document for nearly 60 years.  By the mid-1990s, 
however, both business and government were frustrated with the state of 
telecommunications regulations and in 1996 substantially amended the 
Telecommunications Act of 1934 and passed the Telecommunications Act of 
1996. These documents, written and passed by Congress, sub-divide into six 
“Titles,” which spell out the regulatory policies of different mediums.  Title I is 
“miscellaneous.” It states the purposes of the FCC, its mission, how it is 
organized, etc. and contains a set of definitions. Title II governs communications 
services of common carriers.  Title III governs spectrum licensing and licensees, 
including mobile radio, DBS, radio and television stations.  Title IV is not 
concerned with a specific medium, but instead dictates procedural and 
administrative provisions. Title VI governs cable communications, and contains a 
list of definitions pertinent to its provisions.   
In a discussion of the FCC’s authority concerning network neutrality 
regulation; Title’s I and II are those with which to be concerned.  The computer 
inquiries had classified high-speed Internet as a lightly regulated “information 
service”; the Telecommunications Act of 1996 maintained this stance and placed 
high-speed Internet under Title I.  This is an important point, because it 
announced the intention of Congress that high-speed Internet not be a regulated 
medium, at least not regulated in common carrier status. If instead, Congress 
had classified high-speed Internet as common carriage and a Title II service, it 
would be subject to common carriage regulation, but this is not the case.  The 
FCC in its 2005 Internet Policy Statement and its 2009 Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, which seeks to expand the 2005 policy statement, are relying on 
“ancillary jurisdiction” over a Title I service.  Ancillary jurisdiction is a regulatory 
and judicial creation said to arise under Title I, but necessarily exercised in 
 34
furtherance of a regulatory mandate contained elsewhere—e.g., in Titles II, III or 
VI.  Whether the FCC has the authority to regulate high-speed Internet resides in 
Chapter V, but for now, it was necessary to provide some background in 
examining the Telecommunications Acts of 1934 and 1996 (Esbin, 2009). 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The FCC is a standalone federal agency created through Congress’ 
passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1934.  The amendment of this act in 
1996, passed with the intention of limiting regulation with in the 
telecommunications industry should have limited the power and scope of the 
FCC in its regulatory status.  In reality, however, the opposite effect exists and 
the FCC’s size, budget and scope have increased dramatically.  This chapter 
sought to outline the history of the FCC since its inception and to document only 
a few of the missteps that have had major implications to both business and 
consumers.  Harold Furchtgott-Roth, a former FCC chairman and from whom I 
gathered much of this information, believes he understands the problems 
associated with the FCC.  His belief is that lack of effective oversight by 
Congress and lack of intervention by either the executive branch or courts 
creates an agency that has effectively sidestepped idea of separation of powers.    
Debate is at hand today as to whether the FCC has authority to regulate 
access to the Internet.  The Internet has become, over the last decade, a tool 
essential to nearly everyone, including business, academic and government 
interests and those who seek government regulation to ensure the perpetuation 
of network neutrality should consider the direction that desire is taking.  The only 
foreseeable governmental response to blanket network neutrality regulation is 
through the FCC.  Congress has, on numerous occasions, attempted and failed 
to draft legislation in the form of an independent law that would mirror the 
language in the FCC’s NPRM and is unlikely to amend the Telecommunications 
Act in time to have a positive impact.   
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 The FCC’s Chairman Julius Genachowski, in his October 2009 address 
announcing the FCC’s decision to seek adoption of its NPRM designed to 
describe how access to the Internet will be regulated in the United States, 
describes an FCC with only the best intentions for a “free and open Internet.”  
The FCC’s history, however, is filled with examples of good intentions that turned 
into examples of unnecessary delays, wasted money, misguided interpretation, 
unintended consequences and regulatory failures.  Those who seek government 
regulation of the Internet should consider this history before adoption of this 
NPRM or any regulatory measure designed by the FCC that regulates access to 
the Internet. 
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IV. NETWORK NEUTRALITY REGULATION POSITIONS 
There exist two sides to the debate surrounding the need or lack thereof 
for network neutrality legislation.  One side includes the FCC, a number of the 
fathers of the Internet such as Vint Cerf, and individuals involved in 
telecommunications law, such as Tim Wu, who determine that without some sort 
of governmental regulation, the Internet will change based on inevitable business 
decisions made by broadband providers.  The other side of the debate includes 
the broadband providers themselves, another group of individuals involved in 
telecommunications law such as Christopher Yoo, who believe regulation is 
unnecessary, and a third group that reasons that the current direction the 
government is taking in regard to how regulation will be conducted is first and 
foremost not legal.  The final group’s position grew stronger in April 2010, based 
on a decision in the FCC v. Comcast case.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit ruled against the FCC in this case, stating that the 
FCC did not have the proper authority to dictate the management decisions of a 
network provider.  The judge in the case ruled that Congress had nowhere given 
the FCC authority to regulate the practices of network providers and that the 
2005 Internet policy statement which the FCC had based their case against 
Comcast was insufficient as a regulatory document (Kendall, 2010). 
The debate, surrounding network neutrality, grew, side by side with the 
expansive growth of the Internet and its importance on a day-to-day basis for so 
many people.  However, parties on both sides of the debate essentially agree the 
concept of network neutrality or more directly that a policy of non-discrimination 
is valid and that in the majority of instances the Internet today is neutral.  The 
essence of the debate today is what and/or if regulatory intervention is necessary 
in order to maintain the state of neutrality, we have already.  If deemed 
necessary, the form that the regulation will take is also in debate.  This chapter 
will examine the arguments of both sides of the debate.  Examples will illustrate 
where a lack of competition has already led to activity detrimental to consumers 
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not just concerning network neutrality but also throughout the history of 
telecommunications. The argument that government regulation is unnecessary 
follows.  This section will argue that blanket regulation of broadband providers 
will stifle investment in network growth and that the competition so many say is 
lacking is actually thriving.  A third side, whether the FCC has the necessary 
jurisdiction as the agent of network neutrality regulation also exists completes the 
chapter.  This section illustrates that nowhere in the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 exists language that permits the FCC to regulate access to the Internet.  
Evidence presented in this chapter supports recommendations and conclusions 
that offered in Chapters V and VI.   
A. GOVERNMENT REGULATION PROPONENTS 
The essence of the argument provided by those who support 
governmental regulation to ensure the perpetuation of network neutrality is that in 
the absence of government intervention broadband providers will begin to inject 
instances of discrimination of content for those utilizing their network.  The 
discrimination in question could take any number of forms.  Various forms of 
discrimination exist and include: 
• the direct blocking of certain applications; 
• simply favoring certain applications or websites; 
• charging content providers to reach customers (access tiering); 
• A policy of network providers that hides the specifics of their 
network management policies, referred to as a policy of non-
transparency. 
 Without question, evidence of this sort of behavior by broadband providers 
exists.  The most visible, and perhaps the example that most vigorously fuels the 
network neutrality debate, is the blocking of BitTorrent by Comcast. In this case 
Comcast had been, blocking or slowing the peer-to-peer transfer of large files 
between members of BitTorrent.  The blocking was done without informing its 
 39
customers and indeed initially Comcast when confronted with allegations of this 
behavior denied them (Schatz, 2010).  In this case, Comcast acted in the 
interests of limiting congestion on its network, but other reasons for 
discrimination exist.  In 2006 testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation Vint Cerf, inventor of Internet Protocol 
specifically points out the FCC’s ruling that the Madison River Telephone 
Company’s blocking of ports used to access Voice over Internet Protocol 
services through the company’s DSL service (Cerf, 2007).  In this case, the 
Madison River Telephone Company was not blocking VoIP applications in order 
to ease congestion on its network.  Instead, it was acting to gives its own 
telephone service a competitive advantage over the less expensive VoIP 
technology.   
1. Lack of Broadband Competition 
Those seeking broadband regulation have as their goal, preventing 
instances of discrimination by network providers.  One theory this group offers 
suggests discrimination will inevitably exist due to a lack of broadband 
competition in the United States. Tim Wu in his 2006 testimony illustrates 2004 
data from the FCC showing that, at that time, 94 percent of Americans had zero, 
one, or two choices for broadband access.  Figure 2 is the actual map from the 
FCC website showing the United States broadband choices nationwide in 2004.  
Along with the FCC data, a quote from the conclusion of his testimony illustrates 
Tim Wu’s depth of concern for the level of competition in the broadband market: 
This Mission-protecting consumer choice against market power- is 
a minimum and appropriate role of government.  I would not be 
here if there were five broadband providers, each competing to give 
customers the best and fastest service possible…..The problem is 
the lack of choice in this market. (Wu, 2006) 
Proponents of legislation argue this lack of competition will subsequently 
create market concentration providing the necessary financial motivation for 
discrimination to exist.  Strengthening this position are several instances of 
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discrimination that have violated network neutrality’s guidelines already as well 
as examples throughout the history of telecommunications that exist to support 
the claim.  Comcast’s blocking of BitTorrent and Madison River Phone 
Companies blocking of VoIP ports most closely associated with network 
neutrality.  In his 2006 testimony, Tim Wu argues that incidents of this type are 
not specific to the Internet and offers historical precedent illustrating the early 
telegraph industry where Western Union formed an exclusive partnership with 
the Associated Press.  This exclusive partnership prevented the growth of 
fledgling news sources.  Wu additionally points out AT&T’s anti-competitive 
behavior during the mid-twentieth century, which prevents the use of any 
hardware other than hardware produced by AT&T on its network.   
 
Figure 2.   Broadband Options Nationwide 2004 (From Broadband 
Competition 2004) 
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2. Access Tiering 
Another fear that spurs the need for network neutrality regulation for some 
is the concept of creating separate Internet domains.  This theory would have 
broadband providers creating a separate network that would charge fees to 
content providers in order for the content of their websites to travel on a faster 
network.  Those who oppose this type of separate network environment see this 
as more than just broadband providers charging more for a better service.  Under 
this sort of system, content providers pay a fee to be on the faster network.  
Those opposing a separate faster network point out that today anyone with an 
innovative idea or intelligent thought to express can post this on the Internet and 
it will reach anyone wishing to use it or view it.  Under this tiered Internet design, 
if someone has a great idea or thought and wishes it to reach as many people as 
possible as quickly as possible, they will want to place their content on the faster 
network which would now not be free.  Vint Cerf, in his 2006 testimony to 
Congress, spoke on the subject of access tiering believing the concept is 
contrary to the founding principle of end-to-end design: 
Allowing segmentation of the broadband networks into capacious 
‘broadest-band’ toll lanes for some, and narrow dirt access roads 
for the rest, is contrary to the design and spirit behind the Internet, 
as well as our national competitive interests.  And by definition, 
favoring some disfavors others …. (Cerf, 2006) 
Cerf, along with Tim Wu, also point out that the content providers, that would be 
forced to now pay a fee to reach the most possible customers are in no way 
customers of the broadband providers they would be paying.  The customers of 
the broadband companies are the individuals utilizing the bandwidth to view the 
content of the innovators who create the content on the Internet.  The following is 
Tim Wu discussing the concept of charging companies to reach customers in a 




Second, access tiering is another word for charging companies a 
termination fee—a fee to reach customers of the service provider in 
question...If you can generate revenue by charging content 
providers to reach customers, as opposed to charging for 
bandwidth something happens.  The incentives become mixed, as 
the provider gains an incentive to maintain a level of scarcity and 
thereby maximize gatekeeper revenue. (Wu, 2007) 
Lawrence Lessig is one of the staunchest advocates of the need for 
network neutrality regulation and in a June 2006 Washington Post article, he 
points out that the neutrality that existed in the early Internet, and survives today 
is the driving force that made the Internet the incredible tool it has become.  This 
quote from the article illustrates how he believes access tiering will affect the 
Internet: 
Without net neutrality, the Internet would start to look like cable TV. 
A handful of massive companies would control access and 
distribution of content, deciding what you get to see and how much 
it costs. Major industries such as health care, finance, retailing and 
gambling would face huge tariffs for fast, secure Internet use -- all 
subject to discriminatory and exclusive deal making with telephone 
and cable giants.  (Lessig, 2006) 
The arguments of Vint Cerf, Lessig, Tim Wu and others who oppose this 
sort of separate network design do not advocate that broadband providers not be 
able to charge their customers for enhanced service.  They do state that access 
tiering will cost the consumer more as content providers pass on increased costs 
but increased cost is not the basis of their argument.  Instead, their belief is that 
by charging content providers a fee to reach the most viewers, what will now 
exist is an Internet that looks increasingly how major broadband companies want 
it to look, because those willing to pay broadband providers the most for the 
fastest access to their networks will have a competitive advantage. The central 
theme however, for those who oppose the idea of access tiering, is the gradual 
erosion of the innovation that has made the Internet what it is today.  In other 
words, removing the decision making in regard to what will thrive on the Internet 
from the hands of the people and placing it in the hands of the broadband 
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providers not only violates the end-to-end principle on which the Internet was 
founded, but alters the Internet from a creative tool and turns it into a billboard.  
B. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OPPONENTS 
Those who determine network neutrality regulation is unnecessary and/or 
potentially harmful along with those that believe the manner in which the 
government is pursuing regulation of access to the Internet has no legal 
document as its basis, argue the other side of this debate.  Their arguments 
consist of several points including: 
• Industry-wide rules regulating access to the Internet are 
unnecessary and potentially harmful; 
• Sufficient competition in broadband market does exist to prevent 
network neutrality missteps; 
• The rules as suggested in the FCC’s NPRM would have a negative 
impact on broadband investment and employment. 
The essence of their argument is that the Internet as it exists today is essentially 
neutral and it is unclear if blanket regulation will even have the desired effect of 
ensuring the Internet as it is today. 
1. Regulation Unnecessary and Outcome Unclear 
Broadband providers, in general, are not opposed to the concept of 
network neutrality on the Internet.  Shortly after the October 2009 release of the 
FCC’s NPRM, AT&T released the following statement on the public policy page 
of its website: 
AT&T shares both President Obama’s and Chairman 
Genachowski’s vision of an open Internet-an Internet with a level 
playing field that benefits consumers and stimulates investment, 
innovation and jobs. (AT&T.com, 2009) 
While that public statement seems to point out AT&T’s desire to work with 
the government to perpetuate network neutrality, earlier in October AT&T had 
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urged its employees to weigh in on the FCC website against the NPRM as 
written.  In a letter from Jim Cicconi (Senior Executive Vice President-External 
and Legislative Affairs for AT&T), AT&T urges its employees to point out to the 
FCC arguments including: 
• The existing fierce competition for wireless and broadband customers; 
• The need for network providers to manage their networks in the best 
interests of their customers; 
• The rules in the NPRM will jeopardize instead of aiding the goals the 
Obama administration is trying to achieve; 
• And that the FCC shouldn’t burden the broadband industry, but if it 
does it needs to do so fairly and that any new rules should apply 
equally to network providers, search engines and other information 
providers (Chasik, 2009). 
This last request stems from an incident earlier in 2009, which highlights 
one of the frustrations network providers have with regulation.  AT&T had pointed 
out in September 2009 that Google, one of the loudest voices in the call for 
network neutrality regulation, had openly violated the FCC’s existing principles 
with actions taken by its Google Voice application.  Google Voice had been 
blocking calls made by its users to certain rural areas, thus reducing its costs.  Its 
competitors are prohibited from acting in this manner by Title II of the 
Telecommunications Act.  Google Voice justified its blocking of these calls by 
proclaiming itself “not a traditional phone service and shouldn’t be regulated like 
other common carriers”.  AT&T offered this example to illustrate that the rules as 
written because they are aimed only at network providers would put the network 
providers at a competitive disadvantage. 
The eventual effect of the regulation, as proposed, is also unclear.  Within 
months of the FCC’s announcement of its NPRM, groups that should benefit from 
the existence of network neutrality rules began expressing concern with the 
wording of the NPRM.  In January 2009, Netflix pointed out their concern with the 
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“managed services” portion of the NPRM, which Netflix believes would allow 
network providers to continue to act in the best interests of their networks to 
optimize bandwidth (Lasar, 2009).  The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) 
takes that argument one-step further.  The EFF points out that the NPRM’s 
current wording would not block, but would instead justify the behavior it was 
trying to prevent.  Network providers claiming to act under the premise of 
“reasonable network management” would then be permitted to partake in the 
same type of behavior, as did Comcast when it blocked BitTorrent traffic 
(Esguerra, 2010).  These last two examples come from groups that seek to 
maintain network neutrality.  Coupled with the network providers’ fears that 
industry-wide regulation of access will create uncertainty that is destined to curb 
investment in additional broadband infrastructure, a strong case is presented in 
opposition of regulation. 
2. Broadband Competition Today 
Proponents of network neutrality regulation have as one of their strongest 
arguments that a concentration of market power due to a lack of broadband 
competition creates the motivation for broadband companies to violate the 
principles of network neutrality.  Provided earlier was the FCC’s data that 
illustrated the number of providers of broadband service as of 2004.  Figure 4 
and Figure 5 illustrate a comparison of the 2004 data with new data current as of 
December 2008.  An examination of the data shows it is clear that while 
broadband competition is not fully developed nationwide, it is certainly growing 
and sufficient (more than one or two available providers) competition among 
providers exists in a majority of the United States. These maps are data 
representing fixed broadband providers, the rapid growth of wireless broadband 
providers must now also be taken into account, and Figure 5 is the December 
2008 representation of wireless providers in the United States.  Table 1, also 
from the FCC’s Web site, is evidence of the variety available—not only in 
provider, but in the technology used to access the Internet—and lists nine 
options for consumers requiring broadband access. 
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Figure 3.   Broadband Providers as of December 2008 (From Broadband 
Competition 2008, 2009) 
 
 
Figure 4.   Broadband Providers as of December 2004 (From Broadband 
Competition 2004, 2005) 
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Table 1.   Broadband Options (From Broadband Competition 2010) 
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While the high upfront costs of building infrastructure in the wired 
broadband market is one of the factors that keeps options somewhat limited, 
upfront costs for wireless broadband are less prohibitive.  The Obama 
administration in apparent realization of the potential for increased broadband 
competition through wireless spectrum, signed a memorandum in June 2010 
announcing its intentions, nearly doubling the wireless spectrum available for 
broadband use.  Continued gradual growth in the wired broadband market, the 
rapid expansion of wireless broadband competition and the variety of choices in 
other technologies provide those who oppose network neutrality regulation ample 
evidence that the fears of limited competition are unfounded. 
3. Access Tiering Benefits Consumers 
Christopher Yoo is a Law Professor at the University Of Pennsylvania 
School Of Law and a prolific writer on the subject of network neutrality, his 
specific stance is to take a case-by-case approach to violations of network 
neutrality principles.  In a 2009 paper entitled Network Neutrality After Comcast:  
Toward a case-by-case Approach to Reasonable Network Management, 
Professor Yoo discusses among other things, the potential benefit to consumers 
of network providers utilizing access tiering.  Professor Yoo disputes the claims 
that only wealthy Internet users and large companies or content providers would 
gain access to the faster network.  He theorizes that those requiring faster 
access would and should be able to pay more for the enhanced service and that 
in the absence of this additional revenue providers would raise prices for 
everyone regardless of their required quality of service.  Yoo further points out 
other aspects of access tiering that suggest its potential benefit and include: 
• The 50% per year growth rate of Internet traffic requires network 
providers to generate revenue in some manner in order to continue 
expanding their networks.  Access tiering is the fairest way for those 
utilizing the most bandwidth to fund infrastructure growth. 
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• Content providers primary means of acquiring revenue is through 
advertising on their websites.  The increase in users of a content 
provider’s website using a faster network would initiate a parallel rise in 
their advertising revenue and more than offset their increased fee to 
network providers. 
• The suggestion that charging content providers a fee would in effect be 
charging consumers twice is misguided.  Assuming sufficient 
competition among network providers, allowing network providers to 
generate a portion of their revenue via content providers will allow 
them to lower costs to users of their networks (Yoo, 2009). 
While those opposed to access tiering, conclude that charging content 
providers for faster access to their users stifles innovation and goes against the 
basic principles of the Internet.  Those in favor simply consider it the fairest way 
for consumers, network providers and content providers.  Consumers will get a 
choice in the speed of their network connection; businesses will be able to decide 
if consumers desire the benefits of their applications loading at a normal or 
increased rate; and network providers will benefit from the increased revenue 
generated.  Subsequently, the increased revenue will allow network providers to 
continue to expand their networks. 
4. Regulations Effect on Investment and Employment 
As stated earlier, business understands that in some instances regulation 
is necessary in order to preserve competition and protect the consumer.  In these 
instances, when regulation is necessary, the best outcomes occur when the 
outcome of regulation is predictable and evident to the regulated market.  The 
regulated market, broadband providers, in this case do understand the outcome 
of the regulation, however their understanding is that the outcome is contrary to 
the best interests of themselves, consumers and the Internet itself.  In an effort to 
examine the effects the rules that make up the FCC’s NPRM will have on 
employment and the economics of the Internet, Coleman Bazelon, an economist 
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from the Brattle Group, published a study examining the anticipated outcomes 
concerning employment and economic impacts.  His findings, should the rules 
within the NPRM be approved include: 
• A slow-down in revenue growth in broadband by one-sixth over the 
next ten years 
• Over 14,000 jobs would be lost in broadband in 2011 and by 2020 
over 300,000 jobs would be lost 
• Throughout the United States economy over 65000 jobs would be 
lost in 2011 and by 2020 close to 1.5 million jobs would be lost due 
to decreased revenue in broadband (Bazelon, 2010). 
Bazelot gathers evidence for his conclusions from what he believes is the 
FCC’s most closely related regulatory experience; the deregulation of DSL.  
Bazelon points out that in 2002 users of unregulated cable modems for Internet 
access outnumbered regulated DSL subscriptions by two-to-one. Four years 
after DSL was unregulated and gained even competitive standing with cable, 
DSL lagged by only 15%.  Bazelon translates this into a 15% decline in growth 
rate and uses it as one of the estimates that would reduce broadband growth by 
1/6th in the presence of the rules of the NPRM.     
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The essence of the debate surrounding whether or not regulation is 
necessary to perpetuate network neutrality within the network is whether 
sufficient competition exists in the broadband market to stem motivation for a 
monopoly or duopoly of providers to take action that violates network neutrality 
principles.  Those seeking regulation suggest sufficient competition does not 
exist and inevitably, financial motivation will compel network providers to violate 
the most basic principles of the Internet for their own gain.  This group is 
especially fearful of a system proposed by network providers called access 
tiering.  Under this model, network providers would offer network management 
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principles whereby content providers could pay to have their applications loaded 
from a faster network seemingly reaping the benefits of reaching more users.  
Those who oppose this strategy suggest that charging content providers to reach 
users most importantly will take the innovation that makes the Internet a success 
out of the hands of the hands of the users of the Internet as a whole and place it 
in the hands of major corporations and those with the most capital.    
Network providers fear the impact of blanket regulation on an industry that 
in their opinion has not provided sufficient evidence of a need for it.  Providers 
believe the rules as suggested and imposed on them may also unfairly benefit 
content providers and search engines such as Google. The network providers 
also defend their suggestion of a tiered Internet.  They claim that the presence of 
a tiered network system benefits everyone involved including consumers.  Their 
most fervent argument however, supported by the study done by Coleman 
Bazelon, is that imposing these rules as stated will, even if they succeed in 
perpetuating network neutrality on the Internet, have a much greater negative 
impact on growth and employment in the broadband industry.   
 52
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 53
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Proposals suggesting what should be done in order to maintain the current 
state of neutrality in the Internet are many.  The first decision that needs to be 
made before accepting any of these proposals is as simple as deciding whether 
regulation is truly necessary, or if the Internet will remain in its present state 
without government action.  Should it be decided that regulation is necessary 
subsequent debate exists regarding what agency, within the government, should 
provide the regulation and what form it will take.  Congress, on numerous 
occasions, has considered but failed to pass laws that would serve to regulate in 
favor of network neutrality and many would suggest that a law of this type or a 
rewrite of the Telecommunications act are the only feasible solutions.  Currently, 
the form that network neutrality regulation is taking lies with actions being taken 
by the FCC.  In October 2009, the FCC released its Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, which seeks to codify the 2005 Internet policy statement with the 
addition of two additional rules that prohibited discrimination and ensured 
transparency of network management principles.  The NPRM relies, however, on 
ancillary jurisdiction the FCC claims over the Internet as a Title I service under 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the same jurisdiction the FCC utilized in its 
case against Comcast’s blocking of BitTorrent.  The validity of this jurisdiction 
was jeopardized when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
decided against the FCC in the Comcast case in April 2010.  This case 
essentially established precedent putting into question any FCC ruling, which 
relied upon the rules established in the NPRM.  
In light of the Comcast ruling, the FCC has proposed another course of 
action by which it will regulate access to the Internet.  In June 2010, the FCC 
released a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) which suggested alternative actions the FCC 
could take in regard to regulating access to the Internet  that would overcome it 
lack of jurisdiction under its ancillary Title I jurisdiction.  The FCC, in its Notice of 
Inquiry, seeks public comment on three proposals it suggested: 
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• Whether the classification of high speed Internet as an  “information 
service” remains adequate to accomplish its perceived mission 
• If not adequate the FCC requests comment on the legal and practical 
consequences of classifying Internet connectivity service as a Title II 
“telecommunications service” under the Telecommunications Act  
• Comments on a third way to deal with network neutrality under which 
the Commission would:  
o (i) reaffirm that Internet information services should remain 
generally unregulated;  
o (ii) identify the Internet connectivity service that is offered as 
part of wired broadband Internet service (and only this 
connectivity service) as a telecommunications service; and  
o (iii) forbear under section 10 of the Communications Act 
Comments on this Notice of Inquiry were due July 15, 2010, and replies 
are to be delivered by August 12, 2010.  The resolution that follows from public 
comment on this Notice of Inquiry will likely result in the next government attempt 
at regulation of access to the Internet (FCC, 10-127, 2010). 
Those who oppose government intervention to maintain the Internet in its 
current state of neutrality express varying degrees of opposition to the different 
measures that could be applied as the regulatory decision.  Broadband providers 
opposed codification of the NPRM, but felt more than anything that they were 
simply unnecessary rules that would apply industry wide rules that would conjure 
unpredictable results.  When the FCC announced its intention to reclassify high 
speed Internet as a Title II regulated common carrier service, broadband 
providers responded with much more fervent opposition and are totally against 
actions of this type.  Christopher Yoo in Network Neutrality after Comcast: A 
Case-by-Case Approach to Reasonable Network Management, suggests that 
anti-trust courts should handle cases where network management infractions 
harm consumers or competition on a case-by-case basis, thus preventing the 
blanket restrictions and the unknown results these restrictions would create.  This 
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chapter will examine aspects of the different proposals that could be applied and 
attempt to predict what possible outcomes each of them could provide. 
A. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
Potential actions that could be taken by Congress to protect the neutrality 
of the Internet include passing a separate law that mirrors the language the FCC 
proposed in its NPRM and/or conducting a rewrite of the Telecommunications 
Act with updated language regarding broadband Internet services regulatory 
status, specifically modifying its status as simply an information service.  
Congressional action however has proven difficult to enact.  Between 2006 and 
2008, seven bills that included language supporting the regulation of the Internet 
in hopes of maintaining network neutrality were presented to Congress and all 
seven either failed to pass or were not voted on in time and subsequently died. 
History, it seems, would say it is unlikely that Congress will pass a 
separate law supporting network neutrality.  Congress, however, could take a 
different approach that would also make the FCC’s current job of policing 
broadband providers supplying high speed Internet service easier.  A rewrite of 
the Telecommunications Act that explicitly gives the FCC the authority to regulate 
access to the Internet would, if done correctly, end a great deal of the debate 
surrounding network neutrality.  In May 2010, subsequent to the decision in the 
Comcast decision, Congress made statement that suggested that it was 
beginning to generate proposals for a rewrite of the Telecommunications Act that 
would include revisions updating the regulatory status of broadband Internet 
access (McCullagh, 2010).  If a rewrite of the Telecommunications Act is 
completed it would at least solve probably the biggest problem the FCC is having 
in regard to regulating access to the Internet.  Currently, the FCC is attempting to 
perpetuate network neutrality with no legal framework on which to stand and has 
to rely on language in the current Telecommunications Act which has already 
been defeated in court.  If done correctly, a rewrite of the Telecommunications 
Act would provide the FCC the legal authority to ensure network neutrality on the 
 56
Internet.  The results of what would come, broadband providers would remind, 
are still unknown but, at the least, the government would be operating from a 
legally tenable position. 
B. ACTION BY THE FCC 
As previously mentioned, the FCC is currently the lead government 
agency in regard to potential regulation of the Internet.  The most recent activity 
began in October 2009 with the release of the NPRM, which was derailed due its 
reliance on the same jurisdiction that was proved invalid in the wake of the FCC’s 
loss in the Comcast case.  Long before this decision was finalized, however, the 
legality of what the FCC was trying to do with the NPRM was in question.  
Barbara Esbin, currently in private with the Cinnamon Mueller law firm, but who 
previously served as Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for 
Communications and Competition Policy at the Progress and Freedom 
Foundation had written extensively and testified to the FCC in regard to the lack 
of precedent for the NPRM within the Telecommunications Act.  The following 
quote from her testimony to the FCC summarizes her argument, which proposes 
the lack of legal standing for the NPRM: 
Adoption of the network neutrality rules proposed in the NPRM 
would be unlawful because Congress did not give the Federal 
Communications Commission power to protect Internet openness 
in the Communications Act. The proposed rules regulating the 
services and network management practices of broadband Internet 
providers must rest, if at all, on the Commission‘s implied or 
―ancillary jurisdiction and the NPRM fails to provide a basis upon 
which the exercise of such jurisdiction can be considered lawful. 
(Esbin, 2010) 
In e-mail correspondence with the author, Esbin has discussed her belief 
that in regard to network neutrality legislation the FCC has been acting outside its 
authority, specifically with regard to the NPRM.  Her strong belief is that acting in 
this manner the FCC clouds the effectiveness of our system of government and 
that if legislation is needed, Congress should act and either pass a separate law 
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themselves or give the FCC explicit authority in a modification of the 
telecommunications act to regulate broadband Internet access . 
The FCC, shortly after its defeat in the Comcast case, realized the NPRM 
would not provide sufficient authority for the purposes of regulating access to the 
Internet and changed strategy.  The primary intent of the notice of inquiry is to 
reclassify broadband Internet access as a Title II regulated common carrier 
service.  This approach, if accepted, clearly gives the FCC’s the authority it now 
lacks, however it would very likely face more legal challenge than the NPRM.  
The legal debate would consider that for 15 years since the last revision of the 
Telecommunications Act in 1996 broadband Internet access has been 
interpreted as a lightly or non-regulated “information service”.  Simply deciding to 
now interpret broadband Internet access as a Title II service—because the 
importance of the Internet has grown since 1996—has no legal basis (Esbin e-
mail, 2010).  Additionally, compared to the relatively constrained opposition 
broadband providers provided to the NPRM, opposition to the reclassification of 
broadband as a Title II service from broadband providers to reclassification was 
immediate, resolute and collective.  Shortly after hearing of the new strategy of 
reclassification as Title II, a large group of telecommunications providers 
including Verizon AT&T, Time Warner and quest among others collectively 
addressed the FCC voicing their strong opposition to action of this type.  The 
following quote summarizes their opposition: 
As discussed below, the proposed regulatory about-face would be 
untenable as a legal matter and, at a minimum, would plunge the 
industry into years of litigation and regulatory chaos.  And it would 
threaten to extend common carrier regulation not just to broadband 
Internet access providers, but to huge swaths of the Internet at 
large, betraying decades of bipartisan support for keeping the 
Internet unregulated. This misguided regulatory overreach would 
thereby suppress the private innovation and investment—at both 
the core and the edge of the network—that have made the Internet 
the most powerful engine of economic growth in our time, and that 
are so vital  to achieving your “‘100 Squared’ initiative—100 million 
households at 100 megabits per second” by 2020—which you 
identified as a core objective of the National Broadband Plan.  In 
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short, the Commission should keep this Pandora’s Box of Title II 
classification nailed shut. (Verizon et al., 2010) 
It is clear that the major providers of broadband service are adamantly 
opposed to reclassification and will not accept it without legal challenge.  It does 
however appear that the FCC is going through with its attempt to do so.  Whether 
this will be through a rewrite of the Telecommunications Act by Congress or 
simply as a reinterpretation is yet to be seen. 
C. CASE BY CASE 
As stated earlier, broadband companies do not condone, nor consider 
necessary, blanket regulation of the broadband industry as a means to 
perpetuate network neutrality on the Internet.  Their rationale is that 
implementing regulation could in fact be contrary to the desired end-state of the 
NPRM and would, instead of perpetuating a free and open Internet; the NPRM 
would lead to further more restrictive regulation in the future (AT&T.com, 2009).  
Their misgivings about the potential benefits of regulation and the limited scope 
the FCC advertises it will remain are supported by the actions that took place 
following the losses in the Comcast case.  The FCC’s almost immediate change 
in tactics where instead of implementing the NPRM, the FCC now seeks to 
reclassify high speed Internet access as a Title II service seems to support 
broadband providers claims that any regulation will lead to more regulation.  
In the absence of some sort of regulation, however, the question of course 
would remain; what IS going to be done, because incidents of discrimination that 
do go beyond what broadband providers should be allowed inevitably will occur?  
Christopher Yoo proposes his suggestion as case-by-case consideration of 
cases of discrimination.  One would argue that the FCC’s loss in the Comcast 
case make resolution by courts pointless, but in this case the FCC based the 
precedent for their opposition to Comcast’s actions on their own policy statement.  
Christopher Yoo instead suggests basing their precedent on existing anti-trust 
law.  Yoo supports his suggestion by pointing out the Supreme Courts tradition of 
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opposition to blanket regulation of an industry that is still developing and where 
the result of regulation is unclear.  Considering the relative rarity of incidents of 
this type and the variable nature of potential infractions, a case-by-case 
approach has many attractive features. 
D. TECHNOLOGY OVERCOMES ALL 
Proponents of regulation of broadband providers, base their suggestions 
on a perceived lack of competition that will eventually compel providers to 
discriminate in favor of the benefit of their business.  Their argument further 
relies, even in the absence of competition, on a shortage of bandwidth that 
provides broadband companies a reason to discriminate.  The trend in both 
competition and the availability of bandwidth is however toward more competition 
and more bandwidth.  The FCC data presented earlier shows the trend toward 
the increased availability of providers across the country and the growth of fiber 
optic networks, the expanding availability of wireless as a viable option for high 
speed Internet and advances that optimize the use of bandwidth all are factors 
that detract stimulus from broadband provider’s inclination to discriminate. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
My recommendations for perpetuating the current state of network 
neutrality on the Internet are as follows: 
1. No industry-wide rules are placed on broadband providers.  
Individual cases of abuses of network neutrality will be handled by 
the courts using existing anti-trust laws. 
2. While in review of cases of access tiering, courts generally disallow 
partnerships of this type.   
Dealing with anti-competitive behavior by broadband providers in this 
manner offers resolution to cases without burdening the broadband industry with 
regulation that has unintended results.  In regard to access tiering, even if the 
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economic results benefit consumers and the Internet; the potential for loss of 
innovation is too great to risk and tight control over access tiering is required. 
In summary, my recommendations are that neither the FCC nor Congress 
enacts industry wide regulation of the broadband industry.  Instead, anti-
competitive behavior by broadband providers should be handled by anti-trust law 
in the court system.  Within that statement, however, the courts should take a 
hard look at access tiering and consider its benefits or drawbacks.  I believe 
when access tiering is considered it should be disallowed and content providers 
should remain on an equal basis with each other. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSION 
The Internet has become a vital tool for education, government, the 
corporate world and individuals across the globe.  Its success and growing 
importance has created a fear in some individuals that a lack of competition in 
the broadband market will create a situation where the openness of the Internet, 
a principle upon which it was founded, is jeopardized.  These individuals 
conclude that regulation, of some sort, is needed in order to perpetuate the 
Internet as we know it today.  Instances of discriminatory behavior by broadband 
providers, notably Comcast’s blocking of BitTorrent, exist that supply enough 
evidence that perhaps regulation is necessary.  In more recent events, as 
recently as August 2010, it was reported that Verizon and Google, in what were 
termed as “secret meetings,” discussed what amounts to access tiering and had 
nearly come to an agreement, whereby Google would pay Verizon to have 
Google content load faster on users of Verizon networks.   
The FCC has taken the lead in an attempt to protect the Internet through 
regulation.  The task has fallen to the FCC due to a lack of action by Congress, 
which would eliminate a great deal of the legal challenges network neutrality is 
today presenting.  In the absence of Congressional action however, the FCC has 
no legal basis with which to regulate high-speed Internet access and their actions 
to date are attempts, which have been successfully challenged legally. 
Broadband providers oppose industry wide regulation suggesting 
competition in broadband is sufficient and that regulation would likely stifle 
investment in expanding their networks.  Broadband providers also conclude that 
adding tiers to their networks would further improve the Internet.  These added 
tiers would be subsidized by payments from content providers in order to have 
their content load faster on the subsidized provider’s networks.  Opponents of 
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access tiering fear the stifling of innovation if access tiering is implemented and 
fear what could develop if major corporations and broadband providers begin 
collaborating in this manner.   
My research in this area has led me a number of conclusions.  Industry 
wide regulation of broadband providers is not necessary.  Those calling for 
regulation cite the few existing examples of discrimination and these examples 
provide evidence that broadband providers will continue actions of this sort from 
time to time, but not enough evidence to prove that these discriminatory acts are 
the rule rather than the exception.  Without sufficient evidence, it is irresponsible 
to enact regulation, without exact knowledge of the outcome this regulation will 
present, that changes a system that has succeeded to the extent the Internet has 
succeeded. It is less clear what may occur if regulation is adopted.  Further, the 
importance of the Internet and my research into the regulatory history of the FCC 
further led me to conclude that if it is necessary to enact regulation, it should be 
completed by Congress.  The FCC has been left in a weak legal position due to a 
lack of action by Congress.  The result of FCC v. Comcast further highlights the 
FCC’s position.  The blocking of BitTorrent by Comcast may have been an act of 
discrimination, but the FCC lost in this case because it had no legal basis with 
which to dictate that Comcast could not block BitTorrent users.   
In the future, it is very possible that competition and technology will 
overcome many of the forces that today drive acts of discrimination.  Continuing 
to refine how bandwidth is utilized, and the rapidly growing use of wireless for 
broadband purposes, will mitigate the need for broadband providers to 
discriminate.  The line that separates wired network providers from those 
supplying Internet wirelessly will also create increased competition and the trend 
toward increased competition will continue and expand.  In instances where 
discrimination does occur, judicial action in anti-trust courts is a more dynamic 
medium through which to decide individual cases where discrimination hurts 
either consumers, companies or the Internet itself.   
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
1. Analysis of the Continued Need for the FCC 
Some have argued that an analysis of whether the continued existence of 
the FCC is necessary.  My analysis of the FCC’s role in network neutrality has 
not convinced me that the FCC should be abolished, but a thorough examination 
of this question would be worthwhile and should be given serious consideration. 
2. Continued Review of the Network Neutrality Debate 
 While at this time no regulation is required to maintain network neutrality in 
its current state on the Internet, the Internet and the broadband industry continue 
to grow rapidly and an analysis of its need should periodically be conducted 
periodically.  I suggest reevaluating this question should occur every five years.  
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